LECTURE IV

The subject of these lectures is a very vast and complicated one. I have endeavoured to compress the substance of my lectures within the required limits, expecting to go through the whole discourse in three days, but my calculations have failed, and I have hardly finished even the introduction. These lectures must necessarily remain imperfect, and all I could do in them was to lay before you a few suggestions upon which you should meditate.

A good deal will depend on your own exertions. The subject is very difficult; it ramifies into various departments of science, and the truth I have been putting forward will not be easily grasped, and I might not even have succeeded in conveying my exact meaning to your minds. Moreover, as I have not given reasons for every one of my propositions, and have not cited authorities in support of my statements, some of them might appear strange.

I am afraid that before you can grasp my real ideas, you will have to study all the existing commentaries on the Bhagavaḍ-Gīṭā, as well as the original itself, according to your own light, and see besides this to what conclusions the speculations of 93the western scientists and philosophers are gradually leading. You will then have to judge for yourselves whether the hypothesis which I have attempted to place before you is a reasonable one or not.

In my last lecture I stopped at the eleventh chapter of the book.

In that lecture I pointed out the various passages relating to the Logos, which I thought would support and justify the assertions I made in my preliminary lecture about its nature and its relation to mankind. I shall now proceed to point out the passages to which it is desirable to call your attention in the succeeding chapters.

In chapter xii, to which I shall have to refer again in another connection, I have to ask your attention to the passages with which it commences. There Kṛṣhṇa points out the distinction between meditating and concentrating one's attention upon the avyakṭam of the Sāṅkhyas and fixing the mind and relying upon the Logos.

I have already shown in what important respects the Sāṅkhya philosophy differed from the Veḍānṭic system of Kṛṣhṇa. Kṛṣhṇa has stated in various places, that their avyakṭam was different from his Parabrahmam—that he was by no means to be considered a manifestation of that avyakṭam—and now he tells Arjuna in this chapter that those who try to follow the Sāṅkhya philosophy and endeavour

94to reach that avyakṭam by their own methods, are placed in a far more difficult position than those whose object is to search for and find out the Logos.

This must naturally be so, and for this reason. This avyakṭam is nothing more than Mūlaprakṛṭi. The Sāṅkhyas thought that their avyakṭam was the basis of the differentiated Prakṛṭi with all its guṇas, this differentiated Prakṛṭi being represented by the three principles into which I have divided the solar system. In case you follow the Sāṅkhyan doctrine, you have to rise from upāḍhi to upāḍhi in gradual succession, and when you try to rise from the last upāḍhi to their avyakṭam, there is unfortunately no connection that is likely to enable your consciousness to bridge the interval. If the Sāṅkhyan system of philosophy is the true one, your aim will be to trace upāḍhi to its source, but not consciousness to its source. The consciousness manifested in every upāḍhi is traceable to the Logos and not to the avyakṭam of the Sāṅkhyas. It is very much easier for a man to follow his own consciousness farther and farther into the depths of his own inmost nature, and ultimately reach its source—the Logos—than to try to follow upāḍhi to its source in the Mūlaprakṛṭi, the avyakṭam. Moreover, supposing you do succeed in reaching this avyakṭam, you can never fix your thoughts in it or preserve your individuality in it; for, it is incapable of retaining any of these permanently. It may be that to reach it means to take 95objective cognisance of it, but even that you cannot do from the standpoint of kāraṇa sharīra. You have to rise to a still higher level before you can look upon Mūlaprakṛṭi as an object. Thus, considering avyakṭam as an object of perception you cannot reach it until you reach the Logos. You cannot transfer your individuality to it, for the simple reason that this individuality derives its source from a quarter altogether different from the Mūlaprakṛṭi or the avyakṭam of the Sāṅkhyas, and this avyakṭam in itself has no individuality, and does not generate by itself anything like an individuality, it is impossible that anybody's sense of ego can be transferred to and preserved permanently in it.

What, then do the efforts of all those who try to follow the Sāṅkhyan doctrine end in? Kṛṣhṇa says, that after arriving at the plane of kāraṇa sharīra, “they will come to him,” finding it impossible otherwise to reach this avyakṭam for the reasons indicated above. So when Arjuna asks whether avyakṭam or the Logos is to be the goal, Kṛṣhṇa says that the latter must be looked upon as the ultimate destination, because those who try to follow the line indicated by the Sāṅkhyas have tremendous difficulties to contend with. If anything is gained at all by following this latter course, it is that end which is also to be gained by following his path, by making him the object of meditation, and looking upon him as the ultimate goal.

96Read chapter xii, verses 3, 4, and 5 in this connection:

Those who are kind and charitable towards all creatures, and who, with a properly balanced mind and with senses under control, meditate on the imperishable and undefinable avyakṭam, which is all-pervading, unthinkable, undifferentiated and unchangeable, reach me alone. But the difficulty of those who fix their minds on avyakṭam is great. The path towards avyakṭam is travelled by embodied souls under very great difficulties.

This description refers to the avyakṭam of the Sāṅkhyas.

In chapter xiii we find the following in the first four verses:

O son of Kunṭi, this body is called Kṣheṭra (upāḍhi or vehicle). That which knows this Kṣheṭra the wise call Kṣheṭrajña (the real self or Ego).

Know also that I am the Kṣheṭrajña in all Kṣheṭras; the knowledge of Kṣheṭra and Kṣheṭrajña I consider to be real knowledge.

Hear me. I shall state to you briefly what that Kṣheṭram is, what its attributes are, what qualities it generates, its source and the reason of its existence; and further who that Kṣheṭrajña is, and what powers he possesses. Ṛṣhis have described them in various ways. Different accounts of them are to be found in different Veḍas; and they are also spoken of by the Brahmasūṭras, which are logical and definite.

Here he speaks of kṣheṭram and kṣheṭrajña. Kṣheṭram means nothing more than upāḍhi or vehicle, and Kṣheṭrajña is the Ego in all its forms and manifestations. Kṣheṭram springs from this avyakṭam or Mūlaprakṛṭi. But he says that he himself is 97Kṣheṭrajña in the sense in which every manifested Ego is but a reflection of the Logos, while he himself is the real form of the Ego, the only true self in the cosmos. He takes care, however, to point out in several places that though he is kṣheṭrajña, he is not subject to karmabanḍham; he does not create karma, simply because the self manifested in the upāḍhi is not his own true self, but merely a reflection, which has an individual phenomenal existence for the time being, but is ultimately dissolved in himself.

In verse 4 (see above) he refers to Brahmasūṭras for the details of the three upāḍhis in man, their relation to each other and the various powers manifested by this Ego. Hence it is in that book—the Brahmasūṭras—that we have to look for a detailed examination of this subject.

Turn now to verse 22:

The supreme Puruṣha in this body is called the Witness, the Director, the Supporter, the Enjoyer, the Great Lord and the Supreme Spirit (Paramāṭmā).

It must not be imagined that the word Paramāṭmā here used refers to Parabrahmam. I have already said that it applies to Kṛṣhṇa himself. Though he is Kṣheṭrajña, he is not responsible for karma, and this he explains in verses 30 and 32 of the same chapter:

He perceives the real truth who sees that karma is the result of Prakṛṭi and that the Āṭmā performs no karma.

This imperishable and supreme Āṭmā does no karma and does not feel the effects of karma even while existing

98in the body, as it is without beginning and without Guṇam.

Throughout chapter xiv, Kṛṣhṇa distinctly repudiates any responsibility for karma, or any of the effects produced by the three Guṇams which are the children of Mūlaprakṛṭi. Look at verse 19 for instance:

When the (discriminating) observer recognises no other agent (of karma) than the qualities (of Prakṛṭi), and knows that which is beyond these qualities, he attains to my being.

And now turn to the closing verse in that chapter, a passage we have already referred to in another connection:

I am the image of Parabrahmam, which is indestructible, unchangeable, and (I am) the abode of the eternal ḍharma (Law) and of absolute happiness.

Here he says he is the image of Parabrahmam which is eternal and has no Vikāram, and he is the abode wherein resides the eternal ḍharma of the cosmos, and he is also the abode of bliss, and it is for this reason that the Logos is often described as Sachchiḍānanḍam. It is Saṭ, because it is Parabrahmam; and Chiṭ, because it contains within itself the eternal ḍharma of the cosmos, the whole law of cosmic evolution; it is Ānanḍam, because it is the abode of bliss, and the highest happiness possible for man is attained when the human soul reaches the Logos.

99Now turn to chapter xv, verse 7, a passage which has unfortunately given rise to many sectarian disputes:

It is the amsha which emanates from me and which is manifested from the beginning of time that becomes the Jīva in the world of living beings, and attracts mind and the other five senses which have their basis in Prakṛṭi.

The proposition herein made is a matter of necessary inference almost inevitable from the premises I have laid down: if what constitutes the Jīva is the light of the Logos, which is Chaiṭanyam, and which, becoming differentiated, forms the individual Ego in combination with the kāraṇopāḍhi.

I need not now advert to all the controversies to which this passage has given rise. The verse is perhaps susceptible of more than one interpretation, and the different interpretations were necessitated by the different premises with which the interpreters started.

Read now verse 8:

When the lord, Jīva (human Ego), quits one body and enters another he carries with him the senses as the wind carries the fragrance of flowers from their source.

Here Kṛṣhṇa refers to that human individuality which resides in the kāraṇa sharīra. It is the human monad, or kāraṇa sharīra, that is the one connecting link between the various incarnations of man; when it leaves the body for ḍevachan, it takes with it all the germs of conscious existence, the essence of the 100five Ṭanmāṭras, the Manas and the Ahaṅkāram. Strictly speaking, in every stage of conscious existence, there are seven elements which are always present, viz., the five senses, the mind (also recognised as a sense by some of our philosophers), and the Ego. These are the seven elements that constantly manifest themselves whenever consciousness manifests itself, or conscious existence makes its appearance. They exist in the sṭhūla sharīra, further also in the sūkṣhma sharīra, and they are latent in kāraṇa sharīra. Not only are they latent in kāraṇa sharīra, but even the impulses generated in connection with the seven elements of conscious existence reside in it, and form that latent energy which tries to spend itself, as it were, by bringing about the future incarnations, the environments being those determined by the past karma of the man and the impulses already generated thereby.

In calling attention to verses 12—14:

Know that the splendour which belongs to the sun and illumines the whole world—which is in the moon and in fire—is from me.

Entering into the earth, I sustain all things by my energy; and I am the cause of the moisture that nourishes the herbs.

Becoming fire (of digestion) I enter into the bodies of all that breathe, and being united with Praṇām and Apānam, I cause food of the four kinds to digest.

I have only to point out that what Kṛṣhṇa really means is, that it is his energy that gives to matter all 101its properties, and that all the properties that we now associate with matter, and all those tendencies of chemical action that we see in the chemical elements, did not belong to it or them originally.

When you examine Mūlaprakṛṭi, none of these tendencies are found to be present in it. It is simply the stuff or substance which is endowed with these properties by the action on it of the current of life which emanates from the Logos. Consequently Kṛṣhṇa says that all the qualities exhibited in matter, as in fire, the sun, light, or any other object that you may take into consideration, originally emanate from him, because it was his life, his energy, that gives to matter all the qualities that enable it afterwards to form the various organisms that we now see in the manifested cosmos. In connection with this point you will find it interesting to refer to what is stated, I believe, in one of the ten Upaniṣhaṭs (Kenopaniṣhaṭ) with reference to the mysterious appearance of Parā-shakṭi (Ḍaivīprakṛṭi in Swarga).

When Parāshakṭi first appeared, Indra wanted to know what it was. He first sent Agni to enquire what it was that appeared in that peculiar form. Then Parāshakṭi asked Agni, what functions he fulfilled or what were his latent capacities. Agni replied that he could reduce almost everything to ashes. And in order to show that this attribute did not originally belong to Agni but was simply lent to him, Parāshakṭi placed before him a little bit of grass 102and asked him to reduce that to ashes. He tried his best, but failed. Vāyu was next sent; but he also failed in a similar manner. All this was done to show that Parāshakṭi, or the light of the Logos endows even the Pañchaṭanmāṭras with qualities that did not originally belong to Mūlaprakṛṭi. Kṛṣhṇa is right in saying that he constitutes the real energy of the fire and of all those things he has enumerated.

Now turn to verse 16 of the same chapter, which has also given rise to a considerable number of interpretations:

These two Puruṣhas—the perishable and the imperishable—exist in the world. The perishable is all the living beings, and the imperishable—is called the Kūtasṭha.

The meaning here is clear enough if you will only read it in the light of the explanations already given. Kṛṣhṇa first divides all existing entities into two classes, those not permanent—Kṣharam—by which he means the manifested cosmos, and Akṣharam, or imperishable, which he calls Kūtasṭham, the undifferentiated Prakṛṭi. He also uses the same word, in another passage, in connection with the avyakṭam of the Sāṅkhyas; and it is but natural to conclude that he here uses the same word in the same sense.

In the succeeding verse he says that these two classes are inferior to himself. Although Akṣharam is not destroyed at the time of cosmic Pralaya, as are all the things that come out of it, yet his own 103nature is superior to that of this Akṣharam, and that is why he is called Uṭṭama Puruṣha. For we read in verse 17:

But there is another, the supreme Uṭṭama Puruṣha, called (Paramāṭmā) (the supreme Āṭmā) who is the imperishable Lord, and who pervades and sustains the three worlds.

I have only to refer you, in this connection, to verse 66 of chapter xviii:

Renouncing all religious observances, come to me as the only refuge. I will deliver thee from all sins; grieve not.

To crown all, here is a distinct declaration that he is the one means and the most effectual means of obtaining salvation. These are all the passages to which I wish to call your attention, in reference to the Logos. The passages read go far, I believe, to support every one of the propositions I have laid down in connection with it, as regards its own inherent nature and its relation to the cosmos and to man.

Now, as regards Mūlaprakṛṭi, I have already called attention to it in several places when speaking of Parabrahmam and of the Logos. There is one passage, however, which I did not cite. I believe I have clearly indicated the distinction between this Avyakṭam or Mūlaprakṛṭi and the Logos, as well as that between Mūlaprakṛṭi and Ḍaivīprakṛṭi.

104I have also said that Mūlaprakṛṭi should not be confounded with Parabrahmam. If it is anything at all, it is but a veil of Parabrahmam. In order to support my statements I now ask you to turn to chapter viii, verse 20:

But there is another Avyakṭam superior to the Avyakṭam above mentioned, which is without a beginning and which survives when all the bhūṭams perish.

The preceding verses should also be read:

At the approach of day all manifestations issue from Avyakṭam: at the approach of night, they are absorbed into Avyakṭam.

All these collective beings, produced again and again, are dissolved at the approach of night, O Pārṭha (Arjuna), and are evolved involuntarily at the approach of day.

Here Kṛṣhṇa says that at the time when the cosmos wakes into a condition of activity, all the bhūṭams spring from this avyakṭam; when the time of pralaya comes, they go back into avyakṭam. But lest this avyakṭam should be mistaken for Parabrahmam, he takes care to point out that there is an entity which is higher than this, which is also called avyakṭam, but which is different from the avyakṭam of the Sāṅkhyas and even existing anterior to it. It is Parabrahmam in fact.

It is not an evolved entity, and it will not perish even at the time of cosmic pralaya, because it is the 105one basis, not only of the whole cosmos, but even of this Mūlaprakṛṭi, which seems to be the foundation of the cosmos.

As regards Ḍaivīprakṛṭi, I have already called your attention to those passages in chapter vii, which refer to it.

Thus the four main principles I have enumerated, and which I described as constituting the four principles of the infinite cosmos, are described and explained, precisely in the manner I have myself adopted, in the teachings of this book.

Kṛṣhṇa does not go into the details of the four principles that exist in the manifested solar system, because, so far as the ultimate object of his teaching is concerned, it is not absolutely necessary for him to go into the details of that question; and as regards the relation of the microcosmic upāḍhis to the soul and their connection with each other, instead of giving all the details of the philosophy connected with them, he refers to the Brahmasūṭras, in which the question is fully discussed.

The so-called Prasṭhānaṭrayam, upon the authority of which our ancient philosophers relied, composed of the Bhagavaḍ-Gīṭā, the ten Upaniṣhaṭs and Brahmasūṭras, must be thoroughly examined to find complete explanation of the whole theory.

The main object of the Bhagavaḍ-Gīṭā which is one of the main sources of Hinḍū philosophy—is to explain the higher principles that operate in the 106cosmos, which are omnipresent and permanent and which are common to all the solar systems.

The main object of the Upaniṣhaṭs is to indicate the nature of this manifested cosmos, and the principles and energies therein present.

Lastly, in the Brahmasūṭras an attempt is made to give a clear and consistent theory about the composition of the entity that we call a human being, the connection of the soul with the three upāḍhis, their nature and their connection with the soul on the one hand, and between themselves on the other. These books are not, however, devoted to these subjects only, but each book deals prominently with one of these subjects, and it is only when you take all the three into consideration, that you will have a consistent theory of the whole Veḍântic philosophy.

And now, granting the truth of the premises we have laid down, what are the conclusions that will necessarily follow?

For this purpose the whole of the Bhagavaḍ-Gīṭā may be divided into three parts. Of the first six chapters, the first is merely introductory, the remaining chapters deal with the five theories that have been suggested by various philosophers as pointing out to man the way to salvation; the succeeding six chapters explain the theory which Kṛṣhṇa advocates as pointing out the way which he recommends as the best one to follow, and give such explanations as are necessary. In the last six chapters, Kṛṣhṇa attempts 107by various arguments to point out that it is Prakṛṭi which is mainly responsible for Karma, for even the various intellectual and moral qualities that are exhibited by human beings, for the varieties of the emotional nature, and for the various practices that are followed. It is impossible for me now to go into the whole of this argument in detail. In studying this book the last six chapters should be read first, because one of the main principles that will have to be taken into account in dealing with all the various measures that have been recommended, is therein enumerated and established; and our conclusions will have to be altered if the doctrine those six chapters are intended to inculcate is found to be false or untenable. Of course, in those six chapters, the illustrations are taken, not from matters with which we at the present day are familiar, but from matters which, at the time Kṛṣhṇa gave this discourse, were perfectly intelligible to his hearers, and to the public of that day, and with which they were thoroughly familiar. So it is possible that in the illustrations he gives we may not be able to find those arguments and those considerations, which, perhaps, a modern writer, trying to support the same conclusions, would present to the mind of the reader. Notwithstanding this, the nature of the argument is the same, and the conclusion is true for all time to come. Illustrations will certainly be forthcoming, if necessary, from other departments of human knowledge with which

108we at the present day are familiar. It does not require any very lengthy argument to show, now that the works of Professor Bain and Herbert Spencer have been so widely read, that the human physical organism has a great deal to do with the mental structure of man; and, in fact, all modern psychology is trying to find a foundation for itself in physiology and is perhaps even going to extremes in this direction. The great French philosopher who originated what is called Positivism, would not, in his classification of sciences, assign a separate place to psychology. He wanted to give psychology a subordinate place, and include it, as a branch subject, under physiology.

This classification shows the extremes to which this tendency may lead. If all that is found in the body is nothing more than the material of which it is composed, true psychology is nothing more than physiology, and the mind is but an affection of matter. But there is something more than the mere physical organism; there is this invisible essence that we call the supreme Chaiṭanyam which constitutes the individuality of man, and which is, further, that energy which manifests itself as the consciousness behind the individuality.

It is not material, and it is not likely that science will be able to get a glimpse of its real nature till it begins to adopt the methods of all the great occultists who have attempted to probe into this mystery. But at any rate this much must be conceded; whatever 109the real nature of this essence or life-force may be, the human constitution or the physical body has a good deal to do with the mental development and character of a human being.

Of course the force that operates in all these upāḍhis is, as it were, colourless—it can by itself produce no result. But when acting in conjunction with Prakṛṭi, it is the force that is the substratum of all the kingdoms, and almost every thing in the cosmos is, in a certain sense, traceable to this force. When, however, you begin to deal with particular forms of conscious existence, particular characteristics and developments, you will have to trace them, strictly speaking, to the upāḍhis, or the material forms in which the force is acting, and not to the force itself. So Kṛṣhṇa says all karma is traceable to upāḍhi, and hence to Prakṛṭi. Karma itself depends upon conscious existence. Conscious existence entirely depends upon the constitution of the man's mind, and this depends upon the nervous system of the body and the various elements existing therein, the nature of the astral elements and the energies stored up in the Kāraṇopāḍhi.

In the case of even the astral body the same law holds good. To begin with, there is the aura, which is material in the strict sense of the word, and which composes its upāḍhi. Behind this there is the energy, which is the basis of that feeling of self that even an astral man experiences. 110Going on still higher, to kāraṇa sharīra, there again you find this invisible, colourless force acting within its upāḍhi, which contains within itself the characteristics of the individual Ego.

Go where you will, you will find that karma and the guṇams emanate from Prakṛṭi: upāḍhi is the cause of individual existence.

Existence itself, I mean living existence, is however traceable to this light. All conscious existence, is traceable to it, and furthermore, when spiritual intelligence is developed, it directly springs from it.

Now let us assume that this is the conclusion we are prepared to admit—and I need not enter into the details of the argument, which you will find at length in the last six chapters. Let us now examine in order the various theories suggested by different philosophers. I shall take them as they are dealt with in the first six chapters of this book.

The first chapter is merely introductory. The second treats of Sāṅkhya Yoga, the third of Karma Yoga, the fourth of Jñāna Yoga, the fifth of Karma-samnyāsa Yoga, and the sixth deals with Aṭma-samyama Yoga.

These are the theories suggested by other philosophers, and in this list Kṛṣhṇa does not include that path of salvation pointed out by himself, which is set forth in the second group of six chapters. I believe that almost all the various suggestions made

111by different philosophers can be brought under one or the other of these headings. To complete the list, there is the method suggested by Kṛṣhṇa himself as being of universal applicability and, standing in the background, unknown and unseen, is that occult method, to facilitate which all the systems of initiation have been brought into existence. As this occult method is not of universal applicability, Kṛṣhṇa leaves it in the background and puts his doctrine in such a manner as to render it applicable to the whole of mankind. He points out the defects of each of the other systems, and takes, as it were, the best part of the five theories, and adds the one element, without which every one of these theories will become false. He thus constructs the theory which he recommends for the acceptance of mankind.

Take, for instance, the Sāṅkhya philosophy. I have already explained the peculiar doctrine of the Sāṅkhyan philosophers, that their avyakṭam itself was the one self manifested everywhere in all upāḍhis. That is more or less their Puruṣha. This Puruṣha is entirely passive. It is not the Īshvara, not the active, creative God, but simply a sort of passive substratum of the cosmos, and all that is done in the cosmos is done by Prakṛṭi, which produces all the organisms or upāḍhis that constitute the sum total of the cosmos. They accept the view that karma and all the results that spring therefrom are traceable to this Māyā or Prakṛṭi, to this substratum 112that forms the basis of all manifestation. Now it is through the action of this karma that individual existence makes its appearance. On account of this karma individual existence is maintained, and it is on account of karma that man suffers all the pains and sorrows of earthly existence. Birth, life and death, and all the innumerable ills to which human nature is subject, are endured by mankind owing to this karma. Granting their premises, if the ambition of your life is to put an end to all earthly sorrows, then your object should be to put an end to the operation of this karma.

But the question is, how can you do this? While Parabrahmam remains passive, Prakṛṭi goes on creating the cosmos without its interference. It is not possible to get rid of Prakṛṭi or its guṇams altogether. You may as well try to rid fire or water of all its properties. Thus, karma being the inevitable result of Prakṛṭi, and Prakṛṭi continuing to exist as long as you are a human being, it is useless to try to get rid of karma. But, they say, you must try to get rid of the effects of karma by reducing yourself to the passive state of existence in which Parabrahmam is, remaining simply a disinterested witness. Do karma, not with a desire to do it, but from a sense of duty—because it must be done. The Sāṅkhyas say: give up saṅgam, that desire to do karma, which alone seems to connect the soul with it, and renounce this connection, 113which alone renders the soul responsible for the karma.

What will happen then? They say, when you renounce this desire, karma will become weaker and weaker in its ability to affect you, till at last you arrive at a condition in which you are not affected by karma at all, and that condition is the condition of mukṭi. You will then become what you were originally. You yourself are but a delusive manifestation of avyakṭam, and when once this delusive appearance ceases to exist, you become Parabrahmam.

This is the theory suggested by the Sāṅkhyas. Furthermore, as this avyakṭam, which exists everywhere—which is eternal, and cannot be affected by anything else—forms the real soul of man, to hold it responsible for any karma, is shown in the chapter before us to be but a figment of Arjuna’s fancy. Self cannot kill self. All that is done by the real self is in reality what is done by the various forms of Prakṛṭi. The one substratum is immutable and can never be affected by any action of Prakṛṭi. For some inexplicable reason or other the one self seems to have descended from the condition of passive existence, and to have assumed a delusive active individual existence in your own self. Try to get rid of this delusive appearance, then the result will be that you attain Nirvāṇa.

Kṛṣhṇa examines this theory. He admits two of the premises. He says that all this karma is due to 114upāḍhi, and leads to conditioned existence, subject to all the pains and sorrows of life. But he denies that the supreme end of man's life is to reach this avyakṭam, and he further states that it is far more difficult to reach this avyakṭam than to reach himself; and that even if those who direct all their efforts towards the attainment of this avyakṭam meet with any success at all, it can only be by joining him, for otherwise it is impossible to reach avyakṭam. While accepting two of the conclusions of the Sāṅkhyas, he points out that the real goal is not the one they postulated.

Now let us turn to the second system. This is mainly that kind of philosophy which is inculcated by the followers of Pūrva Mīmāmsa. Every form of ritualism has its basis in the philosophy of Karma-kāṇda. The arguments here used by Kṛṣhṇa in support of his own conclusions will not be quite intelligible to our minds for the simple reason that times have changed during the last five thousand years. At the time this discourse was delivered, the Veḍānṭic ritual was strictly followed, and the conclusions of the followers of Pūrva Mīmāmsa were very well known and were a common topic of discussion. This philosophy was intended to provide a solution for all the difficulties that were common to the other systems of philosophy at that time evolved. But some of the arguments put forward by the Karma Yogīs may be extended beyond the very 115limited form in which they are to be found stated in the books, and can be made applicable even to the life of modern times.

Karma Yogīs say: True, this karma may be due to upāḍhi but it is not due to upāḍhi alone; it is due to the effects produced by the two elements upāḍhi and chaiṭanyam. Those philosophers who want to reject all karma pretend to renounce it altogether. But that is an impossible task. No man, as long as he is a human being, can ever give up karma altogether. He is at least bound to do that which the bare existence of his physical body requires, unless indeed he means to die of starvation, or otherwise put an untimely end to his life.

Supposing you do give up karma—that is, abstain from it in action, how can you keep control over your own minds? It is useless to abstain from an act and yet be constantly thinking of it. If you come to the resolution that you ought to give up karma, you must necessarily conclude that you ought not even to think about these things. That being so, let us see in what a condition you will then place yourselves. As almost all our mental states have some connection with the phenomenal world, and are somehow or other connected with karma in its various phases, it is difficult to understand how it is possible for a man to give up all karma, unless he can annihilate his mind, or get into an eternal state of suṣhupṭi. Moreover, if you have to give up all karma, you have to give up good 116karma as well as bad, for karma, in its widest sense, is not confined solely to bad actions. If all the people in the world give up karma, how is the world to exist? Is it not likely that an end will then be put to all good impulses, to all patriotic and philanthropic deeds that all the good people, who have been and are exerting themselves in doing unselfish deeds for the good of their fellow-men, will be prevented from working? If you call upon everybody to give up karma, you will simply create a number of lazy drones and prevent good people from benefiting their fellow beings.

And, furthermore, it may be argued that this is not a rule of universal applicability. How few are there in the world who can give up their whole karma and reduce themselves to a position of eternal inactivity! And if you ask these people to follow this course, they may, instead of giving up karma, simply become lazy, idle persons, who have not really given up anything. What is the meaning of the expression “to give up karma?” Kṛṣhṇa says that in abstaining from doing a thing there may be the effects of active karma and in active karma there may be no real kārmic results. If you kill a man, it is murder, and you are held responsible for it; but suppose you refuse to feed your old parents and they die in consequence of your neglect, do you mean to say that you are not responsible for that karma? You may talk in the most metaphysical manner you please, you 117cannot get rid of karma altogether. These are the arguments put forward by an advocate of this second view.

The unfortunate mistake that these Karma Yogīs make is this: in their system there is little or nothing said about the Logos. They accept all the thirty-three crores of gods mentioned in the Veḍas and say that the Veḍas represent the Logos or Verbum. They say: “the Veḍas have prescribed a certain course to be followed, and it is not for you to say whether such a course is or is not capable of producing the result to be attained. You ought to take what is stated in the Veḍas as absolute truth, and by performing the various rituals therein prescribed, you will be able to reach swargam. Ḍevas will assist your efforts, and in the end you will attain supreme happiness. That being the course prescribed, we are not called upon to give up all karma, and thereby throw all existing institutions into a state of inextricable confusion.”

To these Karmavāḍīs Kṛṣhṇa says: “One of your conclusions I accept, the other I deny. I admit that an incalculable number of evil consequences will follow as the result of telling people to give up karma, but I cannot admit that your worship of the ḍevas is at all a desirable thing.”

Who and what are these ḍevas? “They are beings on the plane of kāraṇa sharīra. They can never give you immortality, because they are not immortal 118themselves. Even if through worshipping them you are enabled to reach swargam, you will have to return thence into objective existence in a new incarnation. The happiness that swargam can give you is not eternal and permanent, but subject to this disturbance. And what is more, if you worship the ḍevas, concentrating your mind on them and making them the sole object of your attention, it is their bhāvam that you will obtain, and not mine." Taking all these circumstances into consideration, and admitting the many mischievous consequences that in their view will follow as the result of recommending every human being to give up karma, Kṛṣhṇa adds to this system all that is to be found in the teaching that makes the Logos the means of salvation, and recommends man, if he would seek to obtain immortality, a method by following which he is sure to reach it, and not one that may end in his having to go through another incarnation, or being absorbed into another spiritual being whose existence is not immortal. Furthermore, all these thirty-three crores of gods spring into existence with the beginning of every manvanṭara and disappear at pralaya. Thus, when the very existence of the ḍevas themselves is not permanent, you cannot expect that your existence will become permanent by merging it into their plane of being.

I now turn to the third theory—Karma-samnyāsa-Yoga. This Kṛṣhṇa at once rejects as being a most 119mischievous and even impossible course to follow. All the advantages offered by its pursuit may be obtained by doing karma, not as a matter of human affection, passion or desire,but as a matter of duty.

The fourth system is that of Jñāna Yoga. When people began to perceive that it was altogether unmeaning, unless accompanied by proper knowledge, they said it was not the karma suggested by the followers of Pūrva-Mīmāmsa, or the followers of any other particular ritual, that would be of any use for man's salvation; but the knowledge of, or the intellectual elements underlying the ritual, that would be far more important than any physical act could be.

As Kṛṣhṇa says, their motto is, that all karma is intended simply as a step to gain knowledge or jñāna. These philosophers, while admitting that karma should not be rejected, have perscribed other methods of their own, by means of which they thought salvation would be gained.

They said: “Consider karma to be a kind of discipline, and try to understand what this karma really means. It is in fact merely symbolical. There is a deep meaning underlying the whole ritual that deals with real entities, with the secrets of nature, and all the faculties imbedded in man's Pragña, and its meaning must not be taken to apply to physical acts alone, for they are nothing more than what their outward appearances signify.” In addition to mere karma-yoga, they adopted several other 120kinds of yoga, such as japa. Strictly speaking, this karma-yoga is not yoga at all, properly so called. They have added to it anṭar-yoga, praṇāgnihoṭra, and other things which may be more or less considered as refined substitutes for external ritual. Now as regards the theory of these philosophers. All that Kṛṣhṇa has to propose is that their jñāna should be directed towards its proper source. They must have some definite aim before them in their search after truth, and they must not simply follow either japa or ṭapas, or any other method which is supposed to open the interior senses of man, without having also a complete view of the whole path to be traversed and the ultimate goal to be reached. Because, if the attainment of knowledge is all that you require, it may be you still stop short at a very great distance from the Logos and the spiritual knowledge that it can give you. Strictly speaking, all scientists and all those who are enquiring into the secrets of nature, are also following the recommendations of this jñāna-yoga. But is that kind of investigation and knowledge sufficient for the purpose of enabling a man to attain immortality? It is not by itself sufficient to produce this effect. This course may indeed ultimately bring to the notice of man all those great truths belonging to the principles operating in the cosmos, which alone, when properly appreciated and followed, will be able to secure to man the highest happiness he can desire—that is, immortality 121or mokṣha. While admitting the advantages of the spirit of enquiry recommended by this school, Kṛṣhṇa tries to direct it towards the accomplishment of this object.

Let us now examine the fifth system. The votaries of this sect, after having examined what was said by the Sāṅkhyas as well as all the teachings of the other systems we have described, came to the conclusion that it would only be possible to give up karma in truth and not merely in name, if you could somehow or other restrain the action of the mind. As long as you cannot concentrate the mind upon yourself, or turn self towards self, it is not possible for you to restrain your nature, and so long as you cannot do that, it is almost impossible to subdue Prakṛṭi or rise superior to the effects of karma.

These philosophers wanted men to act in accordance with certain recommendations they laid down as a more effectual and positive means of obtaining mastery over one's own mind, without which mastery they considered it impossible to carry out the programme of either the Sāṅkhya or the Jñāna-yoga schools. It was for this purpose that all the various systems of Hatha-yoga with their different processes, by means of which man attempted to control the action of his own mind, were brought into existence. It was these people who recommended what might be called Abhyāsa-yoga. Whatever may be the 122definite path pointed out, whether Hatha-yoga, or that department of Rāja-yoga that does not necessarily refer to secret initiations, the object is the same, and the final purpose is the attainment of perfect control over oneself.

This recommendation to practise and obtain self-mastery Kṛṣhṇa accepts. But he would add to it more effectual means of obtaining the desired end—means sufficient in themselves to enable you to reach that end. He points out that this Abhyāsa-yoga is not only useful for training in one birth, but is likely to leave permanent impulses on a man's soul which come to his rescue in future incarnations. As regards the real difficulties that are encountered in following this system, I need not speak at present, because all of you are aware of the difficulties generally encountered by Hatha-yogīs. Many of our own members have made some efforts in this direction, and they will know from personal experience what difficulties are in the way.

Kṛṣhṇa, in recommending his own method, combines all that is good in the five systems, and adds thereto all those necessary means of obtaining salvation that follow as inferences from the existence of the Logos, and Its real relationship to man and to all the principles that operate in the cosmos. His method is certainly more comprehensive than any of the theories from which these various schools of philosophy have started, and it is this theory that

123he is trying to inculcate in the succeeding six chapters.

As I have already referred to various passages in these six chapters to show in what light you ought to regard the Logos, I need not say anything more now, and if you will bear in mind the remarks I have already made, the meaning will not be very difficult to reach.

In this connection there is one point on which I have been asked to give some explanation.

Reference is made in this book to uṭṭarāyaṇam and ḍakṣhiṇāyaṇam, or day and night, or light and darkness. These are symbolical of the two paths pravṛṭṭimārga and nivṛṭṭimārga. What he calls uṭṭarāyaṇam is nivṛṭṭimārga, represented as day or the path of light, the path he recommends, and the other, ḍakṣhiṇāyaṇam, is pravṛṭṭimārga, or the way which leads to embodied existence in this world.

But there is one expression in the book that is significant. Kṛṣhṇa says that those who follow this second path attain to Chānḍramasamjyoṭih and return thence, while those who follow the first method reach Brahman. This Chānḍramasamjyoṭih is in reality a symbol of ḍevachanic existence. The moon shines, not by its own light, but by the light derived from the sun. Similarly the kāraṇa sharīra shines by the light emanating from the Logos, which is the only real source of light, and not by its own inherent light. That which goes to ḍevachan or swarga

124is this kāraṇa sharīra, and this it is that returns from ḍevachan. Kṛṣhṇa tries to indicate the nature of the Logos by comparing it to the sun or something that the sun symbolises.

I may here draw your attention to one other contingency that may happen to man after death, in addition to those I have already enumerated. Those who have read Mr. Sinnett's Esoteric Buḍḍhism, will, perhaps, recollect that he talks of the terrible fate that might befall the soul in what he calls the eighth sphere. This has given rise to a considerable amount of misunderstanding. The real state of things is that the kāraṇa sharīra may, in very extreme circumstances, die, as the physical body or the astral body dies. Suppose that, in course of time, the kāraṇa sharīra is reduced, by the persistence of bad karma, into a condition of physical existence, which renders it impossible for it to reflect the light of the Logos; or suppose that that on which it feeds, as it were—the good karma of the man—loses all its energy, and that no tendencies of action are communicated to it, then the result may be that the kāraṇa sharīra dies, or becomes merely a useless aggregation of particles, instead of being a living organism, just as the physical body decomposes and becomes a dead body when the life principle leaves it.

The kāraṇa sharīra may become so contaminated and so unfit to reflect the light of the Logos as to render any future individual existence impossible; 125and then the result is annihilation, which is simply the most terrible fate that can befall a human being. Without proceeding further, I must stop here.

I beg that you will all kindly bear this in mind. We have merely commenced the study of Bhagavaḍ-Gīṭā in these lectures. Try to examine, by the light of the statements found in our own books, and in modern books on psychology and science, whether the theory I have placed before you is at all tenable or not—decide for yourselves —whether that is the theory supported by the Bhagavaḍ-Gīṭa itself. Do not rely on a host of commentaries, which will only confuse you, but try to interpret the text for yourselves as far as your intelligence will allow, and if you think this is really a correct theory, try to follow it up and think out the whole philosophy for yourselves. I have found that a good deal more is to be gained by concentration of thought and meditation, than by reading any number of books or hearing any number of lectures. Lectures are utterly useless, unless you think out for yourselves what they treat of. The Society cannot provide you with philosophical food already digested, as though you were in the ideal state of passivity aimed at by the advocates of the Sāṅkhyan philosophy; but every one of you is expected to read and study the subject for himself. Read and gain knowledge, and then use what you have gained for the benefit of your own countrymen.

126The philosophy contained in our old books is valuable, but it has been turned into superstition. We have lost almost all our knowledge. What we call religion is but the shell of a religion that once existed as a living faith. The sublime philosophy of Shaṅkarācharya has assumed quite a hideous form at the present day.

The philosophy of a good many Aḍwaiṭis does not lead to practical conduct. They have examined all their books, and they think with the Southern Buḍḍhists of Ceylon, that Nirvāṇa is the Nirvāṇa promised by the Sāṅkhyan philosophers, and instead of following out their own philosophy to its legitimate conclusion, they have introduced by their Pañchayaṭanapūja and other observances what seems to be a foolish and unnecessary compromise between the different views of the various sects that have existed in India. Visishtāḍwaiṭa philosophy has degenerated, and is now little more than temple worship, and has not produced any good impression on men's minds. Maḍhwa philosophy has degenerated in the same manner, and has perhaps become more fanatical. For instance, Shaṅkarāchārya is represented in their Maṇimañjari as a Rākshasa of former times. In Northern India people generally recite Sapṭashaṭi and many have adopted Shakṭi worship. Kāli is worshipped in Calcutta more perhaps than any other deity. If you examine these customs by the light of Kṛshṇa's teachings, it must appear to you that, instead

127of having Hinḍūism, we have assimilated a whole collection of superstitious beliefs and practices which do not by any means tend to promote the welfare of the Hinḍū nation, but demoralise it and sap its spiritual strength, and have led to the present state of things, which, I believe, is not entirely due to political degeneration.

Our Society stands upon an altogether unsectarian basis; we sympathise with every religion, but not with every abuse that exists under the guise of religion; and while sympathising with every religion, and making the best efforts we can for the purpose of recovering the common foundations that underlie all religious beliefs, it ought to be the duty of every one of us to try to enlighten our own countrymen on the philosophy of religion, endeavour to lead them back to a purer faith—a faith which, no doubt, did exist in former times, but which now lives but in name or in the pages of forgotten books.